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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been increased interest in a new area of research:  the security 
of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA systems are elaborate 
computer systems which have two main functions as their name implies: (1) they manage and 
control critical infrastructure, and (2) they also collect data from critical infrastructure for 
analysis and potential response. Examples of these infrastructures include the power grid, 
chemical plants, and oil refineries [9]. Modern SCADA systems have new vulnerabilities. The 
major issue today is that malicious software, or malware, may be able to access these systems via 
the Internet since SCADA systems are now more connected and open to outside networks.  
Therefore, exposure to malware can affect the operation of SCADA systems [3], [4]. This 
exposure is especially problematic because a SCADA system, a type of cyber-physical system 
(CPS), manages critical infrastructure and affects the physical world. A CPS is defined as a 
system in which there is close interaction between computing devices and the physical world 
[30]. Because of this close interaction, malware could alter the behavior of these systems such 
that (1) they could cause the operation of the plant to run inefficiently meaning increased 
operating costs, or (2) in a worst case scenario, they endanger public safety [1].  
If a cyber-attack occurs on a SCADA system, it is possible that the behavior of the 
system can be modified to deviate from normal operation. Normal operation would be defined as 
the way that the SCADA system was designed to operate in order to meet certain objectives. 
These objectives include safety and also the production of goods or services. It is especially 
problematic for the SCADA System if safety is compromised by a cyber-attack. Because 
SCADA systems manage critical infrastructure, these attacks can have a large physical impact in 
terms of the destruction that they can cause [1].  For example, pressure in a tank could build up 
to dangerous levels if the SCADA system is hacked by an intruder. This increase in pressure, if it 
is substantial, may lead to an explosion. Also from an economic standpoint, it is important to 
understand that this critical infrastructure can take the form of industrial plants, which means that 
revenue could be at stake if the SCADA system is tampered with. This loss of revenue could be 
due to the industrial processes becoming more inefficient. An example of this may be a chemical 
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plant. A certain chemical reaction may have to take place in the chemical processes of this plant 
to produce a certain product. Therefore, the right combinations of inputs with a certain ratio must 
be applied to have the optimal yield of the product. Therefore, it can be seen from these 
examples that economic consequences or issues with safety may occur if SCADA systems that 
manage these processes are compromised [1], [2].  
The reason that research in the security of SCADA systems has become important is that 
recent incidents have in fact occurred in which SCADA systems were compromised. Because 
these types of incidents have a great impact on society, they have been brought to the attention of 
governments and research communities. Some well-known examples that have been studied are 
Stuxnet and the Slammer worm [41]. The Stuxnet worm was an elaborate piece of malware that 
took advantage of vulnerabilities of the Windows operating system in order to damage 
centrifuges in a nuclear facility in Iran. This led to economic loss since these centrifuges had to 
be replaced [31]. The Slammer worm attacked and disabled the network of Ohio’s Besse nuclear 
power plant. As a result, the monitoring system used to ensure safety of the system was unable to 
function, even though there may have been a firewall to protect the system. In this particular 
case, this attack did not cause loss of life or other harm besides economic loss, but it did 
highlight the need for increased security for these systems [8]. 
 
Developments in SCADA Security 
  To counter this threat against SCADA systems, certain measures have been studied and 
created over the course of time. Previously, a great body of literature has been developed that 
deals with computer and network security in general [2]. Some of the methods in network 
security have been applied to SCADA systems in recent work. For instance, one focus of recent 
research has been in prevention or access control by some of the standard techniques used in 
network and computer security. Access control simply means that the computer network is able 
to prevent certain access that is unwanted and allow other access that would be considered 
legitimate. This can be achieved through whitelisting and blacklisting. Whitelisting involves 
comparing applications that attempt to access a resource with a list of approved sources.  
Blacklisting, on the other hand, involves rejecting access to applications that are considered 
malicious. [7] This type of prevention is typically done using a firewall. Firewalls have been 
found to be useful for protecting the network associated with the SCADA system in addition to 
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protecting general computer networks [2]. However, protection may not always be as effective as 
desired. It is possible that malicious software can still bypass this form of security using zero-day 
attacks as in the case of Stuxnet. Zero-day attacks are attacks which take advantage of 
vulnerabilities of hardware and software that have not been discovered by the users of the 
system. These attacks have not been officially discovered by the vendors of this hardware or 
software associated with the SCADA system [2].  Since these attacks are unknown to the users 
of the SCADA system, these systems may not be truly secure, meaning a malicious entity can 
tamper with the system in potentially destructive ways. It is also important to be able to detect if 
an attack is occurring in the system in addition to protecting the system against intrusions [2]. 
Methods of detection have been used in traditional IT systems, such as intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) [28]. These methods are fairly effective.  However, even with existing IDS 
technology, it should be noted that SCADA system security has a major difference from general 
computer security in that the physical system is affected in addition to the computer systems and 
networks. As a result of the new awareness, researchers have been increasingly studying the 
effects of cyber-attacks on physical systems and how these attacks can be detected for practical 
purposes. For example, the plant operator would want to be alerted that an attack has occurred 
and he would want to respond to it appropriately to prevent or reduce any damage or loss, 
whether it is physical or economic [1], [2]. Response in addition to detection was one of the 
objectives in the paper by Cardinas et al [2]. Cardinas discussed an approach of observing the 
physical system and then determining whether there was abnormal behavior. If the plant was 
found to have abnormal behavior, the supervisory system would attempt to place the plant in a 
safe state. The system considered was the Tennessee Eastman Process Control System (TEP-
CS), which is a widely used system in the literature to study SCADA systems. The reason that it 
was studied is that it allows for situations where there could be economic loss or violations of 
safety. As in this current work, it is not the desire of that work to study how specific 
vulnerabilities in software are exploited. What is desired is to use knowledge of the physical 
system to aid in detecting attacks. Observation of the physical system for abnormalities is of 
utmost importance since the physical system is where the potential for danger is the greatest.  
 
Abnormalities in the physical system are typically detected by means of a comparison 
between an ideal system and the system under observation. This can be done using a fault 
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diagnosis method that incorporates model-based diagnosis, which is one of several fault 
diagnosis techniques that may be used [2], [3]. Model-based diagnosis compares the 
mathematical model of the ideal system with sensor data (data from the physical system) 
received by a supervisory system. The model of the nominal system is derived by first principles 
or empirical methods [13]. The comparison is useful to detect an anomaly. In fact, this work uses 
a basic form of model-based diagnosis to determine if there is an anomaly in the behavior of the 
physical system. But it should be noted that, while both of these papers [2], [3] focus on 
detection of attacks on the physical system, there appears to be somewhat of a weakness with 
their approaches for detecting attacks. To understand the weakness more clearly, it is helpful to 
realize that these methods of detection for attacks, by their very nature, would also be suitable for 
fault detection. This means that the attacks that can be observed in the physical system may be 
considered indistinguishable from faults. This would certainly be true with the experiments of 
these aforementioned papers in how the experiments are setup if faults were also introduced in 
the simulation. The faults in that case would be treated as attacks. In fact, Amin et al. [3] seem to 
lump faults and attacks together. In another paper [4], Amin et al. explicitly mentions that there 
is a difficulty in isolating faults from attacks. This inability to make a distinction between an 
attack and a fault may prove to be problematic since the system or the plant operator may need to 
respond differently depending on the situation.  
 
Contributions 
Given more information besides the sensor readings from the physical system, it may be 
hypothesized that it is possible to distinguish between faults and attacks in certain cases, even if 
there is not enough information to do so in all cases. Simply observing the physical system alone 
will probably not allow for this distinction to be made. It should be noted that what is meant by 
“observing the physical system” is that sensor data and other useful information are being sent to 
a supervisory system for analysis. The reason that faults and attacks are indistinguishable is that 
a fault can easily resemble an attack in many cases. For instance, it is quite possible that a fault 
may have an effect that is similar to false data being sent by a malicious entity as seen from 
sensor data of the physical system, which is sent to the supervisory system. The ability to 
distinguish the faults and attacks may be useful so that the SCADA system or the plant operators 
can respond to the situation in an appropriate way, depending on the nature of the anomaly, 
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whether it is a fault or attack. What may be something worthwhile from a research perspective is 
to try to understand network behavior as well in order to aid in understanding the nature of the 
anomaly. A cyber-attack would most likely have a certain effect on the network. Therefore, it 
would be reasonable to study the resulting effects on the network in addition to the physical 
system. Possible effects that could occur are as follows: There could be increased traffic on the 
network, which is something that is discussed in the literature concerning certain types of 
attacks. For instance, the flooding of packets in a network is a type of attack that can increase 
network activity. In an extreme scenario, this could lead to loss of communication, which in turn 
could lead to possibly catastrophic events if a networked control system is the target of this 
attack. Therefore, it is important to study the methods for detecting these types of attacks. It may 
be useful to understand how certain network behavior could influence the behavior of the plant. 
There has been work done to create simulations that would allow the effects of a DoS (Denial of 
Service) attack on the physical system behavior to be studied [30]. Two major types of attacks 
that have been studied which can influence the behavior of the physical system in possibly 
harmful ways are DoS attacks and Deception attacks [1], [2], [30].  
 
The major contribution of this work is to create a methodology or framework to 
distinguish faults and attacks despite the apparent similarities in how they manifest themselves in 
the physical system. Faults and attacks may not have unique enough signatures to allow for them 
to be distinguished from each other adequately in the physical system alone, i.e. using sensor 
readings of the physical system. A “signature” is a pattern or set of symptoms that characterizes 
the fault or attack. Therefore, more information is needed. It is worth considering that attacks 
may have a certain signature that can be detected on the network as well. On the other hand, 
physical faults with a similar signature as seen by the sensors may not have such a signature on 
the network. For faults associated with the network, however, the network may not even send 
any data. This might be seen in no traffic being detected. Therefore, these scenarios seem to have 
fairly unique signatures associated with them if data from both the network and the physical 
system are included. To achieve the ability to distinguish an attack from a fault or to simply 
increase the accuracy in doing so, more information associated with the SCADA system must be 
collected than what was done in previous work.  
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The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the background and 
covers important terms, definitions, and concepts in this work. Chapter 3 deals with the 
experiments. It describes the problem formulation and implementation of the experiments. 
Chapter 4 covers the results of the experiments and includes a discussion and an analysis. 
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions that were made based on all of the work completed. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
In this work, there are several technologies studied and many concepts used. Among 
these are (1) SCADA systems, (2) Control Systems, (3) more specifically, Networked Control 
Systems, (4) Network Security, (5) Faults and Fault Diagnosis techniques, (6) Attacks, (7) 
Intrusion Detection Systems, and (8) Machine Learning techniques for classification. Some of 
these were briefly discussed in the introduction. The purpose of this chapter is to explain these 
important concepts as well as others that are applicable to this work.  
 
SCADA Systems 
SCADA systems are essentially computer systems that manage the control systems used 
in national infrastructure or industrial plants. In recent years, these systems have been found to 
be more likely to experience cyber-attacks for several reasons: (i) They are increasingly using 
technology similar to that of traditional IT systems; (ii) they may be connected to the internet; 
(iii) and they tend not to use the proprietary protocols as in the past. Instead, they use more 
common protocols. The main reason these systems are made to use this technology is to be more 
cost-effective. [3] SCADA systems typically have a main supervisory computer system that is 
connected through a network to other nodes. In computer networks, a node is a device that can 
communicate with other nodes on the network [15]. These nodes may be microcontrollers that 
control certain aspects of the industrial process associated with the SCADA system. These 
devices for SCADA systems in particular are called Remote Terminal Units (RTU), Intelligent 
Electronic Device (IED), etc. These microcontrollers may be connected to actuators or sensors 
[10].  
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Figure 2.1: Electric Power SCADA System, which may also be similar to other SCADA systems [40] (the 
labels, as shown here, were updated by the author for this paper) 
 
Control Systems 
A SCADA system is an elaborate form of a control system that typically has a hierarchy 
associated with it and uses lower-level control systems to manage certain aspects of the critical 
infrastructure. The SCADA system itself is the higher-level supervisory system in the hierarchy 
and manages the lower-level control systems. Each of these control systems would manage a 
particular aspect of the industrial process [3], [9]. A control system incorporates a plant, which is 
the physical system, and a controller, which regulates the plant’s behavior. The behavior of the 
plant can be described in terms of physical quantities associated with the plant that may change 
over time. The physical quantities associated with the plant that must be adjusted by the 
controller are called the manipulated variables in the plant and are inputs to the plant.  These 
variables are adjusted so that a certain objective is meant for the plant. This objective may 
involve these variables being adjusted so that other variables related to them reach a certain 
value known as the set-point. These other variables are the outputs of the plant, some of which 
may be referred to as the measured variables. These measured variables may also be made to 
track a certain function of time instead of a constant set-point. This function is known as the 
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reference signal [14], [16]. Sensors are the devices directly involved with the plant so that the 
measured variables can be known. This data, of course, must be sent to the controller. The 
controller will receive this data as input. Based on the control objective, the controller will send 
commands to an actuator that is directly involved with the plant. An actuator is a device that 
manipulates a physical system and receives the commands from the controller. The following 
figure illustrates a single-input/single-output feedback control system, which is used for this 
work in the interest of simplicity. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Control System with Blocks that Represent the Controller and the Plant. 
 
The cloud in the diagram represents a network through which the manipulated variables 
from the controller are sent to the plant. These manipulated variables are the commands to the 
actuators. Also, the measured variables (the sensor data) from the plant must pass through this 
network in order to be received by the controller. This will be discussed in later sections in the 
chapter.  The controller, of course, sends these commands to the plant based on what it receives 
from the plant in order to meet a certain control objective.  The system is designed with a 
specific control objective to manage the plant or process. One example of a control objective is 
for the level of water in a tank to maintain a certain set-point. The actuator would be the valve to 
allow water into the tank. This valve can be opened or closed by the controller. Or the valve can 
Plant
Network
Controller
Error
Signal
Ref.
Signal
Manipulated
Variable
Measured 
Variables
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take on a range of positions that is neither fully closed nor fully opened. The goal of the 
controller would be to have the water reach that set-point by adjusting the valve.   
 
As was mentioned, a feedback control system is used. This involves measuring the output 
and adjusting the manipulated variable so as to influence the plant with the goal of causing the 
measured variable to track with the reference signal. 
 
Controller 
For this work, a PI controller was used. One of the reasons that it was used is that this 
type of controller is in other related work [2], [3]. The PI controller implements a specific control 
law, which is expressed as a transfer function that describes the controller. The input of this 
transfer function is the error signal. The output of this transfer function is the manipulated 
variable, which is fed as the input to the plant. The error is defined as the difference between the 
reference signal and the measured variable, which is the output from the plant. For this work, it is 
important to express this with discrete time, which is what digital systems use. The controller is 
assumed to be implemented on a digital microcontroller. The control law can be expressed by the 
following transfer function, where the input to this function is the error signal: 
  
     
 
   
 
 
 
(2.1) 
 
Where P is the proportional parameter; I is the integral constant; and Ts is the sampling period. 
These equations are in the Euler form based on the discrete PI controller block used in MATLAB 
Simulink [43]. 
This equation for the transfer function must be implemented in C++ as a simple algorithm. The 
following pseudo-code shows an algorithm that would implement the above transfer function. 
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Figure 2.3: C style Pseudo-Code to Show a Basic Implementation of the Transfer Function. 
 
 
Plant 
The plant is the physical system, and it must be regulated so that it meets the control 
objective. It can be mechanical, electric, hydraulic, or pneumatic, etc. and its behavior is 
generally governed by laws of physics, where the relationship of physical quantities associated 
with the plant can be described in terms of equations. There are many ways that a plant’s 
behavior can be described through mathematics. Creating these mathematical descriptions of the 
plant is a form of modeling. [34] In the case of this work, a linear discrete-time state space 
system will be used which has equations for the simulations that are in continuous form. The 
continuous-time equations are also used for the mode [33]. These are defined as follows:  
 
This is the continuous-time model of the dynamic system: 
 
 
  
{
 ̇̅    ̅    ̅
 ̅    ̅    ̅
 
 
(2.2) 
TransferFunc(ref_signal, measured_value) //called every 10ms 
    { 
error = ref_signal – measured_value; 
        integral = integral + error * dt;  
// integral = 0 for initialization 
// dt = sampling period in secs 
          
        output = Kp*error + Ki*integral 
    } 
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where  ̅ is the vector of the state variable,  ̅ is the vector of the output,  ̅ is the vector of the 
inputs. 
 
Discrete-time Model of the Equations: 
 
  
 ̅        ̅      ̅   
 ̅      ̅      ̅   
 
 
 
(2.3) 
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Networked Control Systems 
For some types of SCADA systems, the control system used has a network which 
facilitates communication between the controller and the plant (This is illustrated in Figure 2.1). 
These control systems are called networked control systems. The controller and plant are 
essentially the nodes in the network. The network, of course, has a delay and limited bandwidth 
associated with it. Delay is defined as the time that it takes for information to travel from one 
point of the network to another. It should be noted that the delay can vary in its duration. 
Bandwidth is defined as the amount of information, usually expressed in bits per second (bps) 
that can travel though the network in a given amount of time. It can be assumed that a networked 
control system or a SCADA system has a regular traffic pattern in normal operating conditions 
for the following reasons: (1) the topology remains unchanged.  (2) The nodes use the networks 
in ways that remain constant or have the same basic pattern according to their original design or 
specification [31]. Deviation from this normal pattern would therefore be indicative of an 
abnormal event or circumstance. A network facilitates the communication between the nodes. 
Communication is done through certain protocols. The information is carried by means of 
packets. A protocol is a specification on how communication will take place so that information 
can be sent from one node in the network to another. It also refers to the service that allows for 
this communication according to a certain set of rules associated with the protocol. Two main 
network protocols are UDP (User Datagram Protocol) and TCP (Transmission Control Protocol). 
UDP is a connectionless protocol. This means that packets that are dropped on the way to their 
destination are not resent. In contrast to this, TCP is another protocol which ensures the delivery 
of the packet through an elaborate method that involves a three-way hand shake for the set-up of 
the connection. Also, with this particular protocol, the recipient acknowledges to the sender that 
it has received the data as communication takes place.  For this work, UDP is used [15]. The 
UDP protocol was chosen for two main reasons: (1) It is simpler to implement than the TCP 
protocol. (2) UDP may be more suitable for real-time systems. A networked control system is a 
real-time system, in that the system must respond to sensor data in a reasonable amount of time. 
A slight advantage of UDP over TCP is that UDP will send the newest data from the plant to the 
controller without much overhead or a complicated process, regardless if some of the datagrams 
are dropped due to abnormal events on the network.  Therefore, the data is more relevant because 
the newest data arrives at the destination without trying to send somewhat older packets, which 
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TCP may attempt to do [15]. However, it should be noted that UDP does have some 
disadvantages, which may cause this protocol to be unreliable in some cases: (1) it can drop 
messages (2) it does not guarantee in-order delivery of packets. TCP on the other hand will 
ensure that all data is sent, meaning that if some packets are dropped, TCP will resend them, and 
it does allow for an in-order delivery. But these data would not be the newest data for the system. 
There is, however, a time to live associated with TCP. Time to live is defined as the length of 
time for when transmission or retransmission is allowed to take place. Beyond this period, no 
retransmission is allowed to occur [15]. Therefore, it is possible to avoid the problem that could 
occur in TCP where retransmission could occur indefinitely.  
 
Network Security 
In this work, it is important to have a basic understanding of network security since 
cyber-attacks are a possible circumstance that an NCS can experience. There are a few concepts 
that should be understood that are relevant to this work which will be discussed.  
Network security has several main components: (1) confidentiality, (2) integrity, and (3) 
availability [31]. Confidentiality involves hiding information.  This component is not dealt with 
in this work. Integrity basically means that data has not been tampered with or that there is no 
deceptive data. There are a few types of integrity: Data integrity means that the content of the 
packets are not modified in any way. Integrity also includes authentication. Authentication 
means that the process or device that desires a resource is who or what it claims to be. In this 
work authentication is not dealt with, but it is still important to understand. Data integrity is dealt 
with in this work.  Also, availability involves resources being available for use in a timely 
manner. All of these aspects of network security must be maintained in order for the network to 
function properly [21]. In the case of this work, the focus is on attacks on integrity and 
availability as far as network security is concerned. These two aspects of security are especially 
important for SCADA systems because unwanted and potentially dangerous behavior can occur 
on the physical system if these components are violated. Therefore, this work focuses on certain 
attacks that are meant to attack integrity and availability of the network such that they would 
influence the behavior of the NCS. 
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There are also three major goals of security: prevention, detection, and recovery. These 
were briefly discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. The focus of this work is on detection, but it is 
also important to do more than just detection. It is desired to diagnose the specific problem that 
the NCS experiences and classify it. Recovery may involve placing the system in a safe state or 
eliminating the problem altogether.  
 
Abnormal Situations Experienced by the Networked Control Systems 
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, there are two main types of abnormal situations that the NCS 
can experience: (1) Faults and (2) Attacks. What follows is a discussion for each of them.  
Faults 
Faults may occur during the operation of the NCS. Although they may be rare, it is not 
known how often they can occur as compared with attacks. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
understand the behavior of faults also. Faults are defined according to Gertler, using general 
terms, [13] as “deviations from the normal behavior of the plant or its instrumentation.” These 
faults could be the result of damage to equipment [12]. It should be noted that these faults may 
impact the physical system such that it operates inefficiently or to the point of causing harm to 
equipment or people. It is also important to understand what kinds of faults can occur. Faults 
may be mechanical, but they may also involve errors in the network or malfunctions in software. 
Some of the more standard faults are those in the physical system, which may be either additive 
faults or multiplicative faults. Additive faults entail unknown inputs being added to the inputs of 
the plant or unknown biases added to the outputs of the plant. On the other hand, multiplicative 
faults in the system may involve the system as described by a matrix to have changes. This could 
be due to changes in the plant parameters due to component faults [13]. Attacks may also exhibit 
similar behavior to faults and may be detected by standard fault diagnosis techniques. One way 
to detect a fault/attack is to use a method similar to what is used in the work by Cardinas et al. 
[3] which focuses on sensors that give incorrect information deviating from their actual readings. 
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Cyber-Attacks 
A cyber-attack, or simply an attack in this work, is an action which undermines the 
security of computer-systems and networks for malicious purposes [37]. There are a few main 
types of attacks that can occur on a network controller as described in the literature: one is the 
DoS (Denial of Service) attack, which has the goal of preventing communication on the network. 
This is an attack on availability. Another is a deception/integrity attack, which is defined as an 
attack in which a hostile entity sends intentionally incorrect information so as to manipulate the 
control system [2]. In the scope of this work, an attack is a cyber-attack and not a physical attack.  
A physical attack is one that would involve an enemy physically causing harm to the system. A 
physical attack, of course, might be considered almost totally indistinguishable from a fault from 
the standpoint of the supervisory system if the only data used comes from the physical system. It 
will be assumed that the physical security of the facility where the SCADA system performs its 
operations is sufficient to prevent any adversary from breaking in. Because the scope of these 
attacks is limited to cyber-attacks like other work in the literature of SCADA security, it should 
be understood that these attacks would require the use of networks and the compromising of 
nodes in order to go about their intended action of penetrating defenses of networks. Knowing 
this, it can be assumed that information from the network would help in detecting an attack.  Or 
at least, it would show that what is occurring within the network is correlated with the physical 
behavior seen by the SCADA system. Also, attacks can be categorized as the targeted attacks 
and the non-targeted attacks. What differentiates the targeted attacks from the non-targeted 
attacks is that with the targeted attacks, the attacker has an understanding of the system and is 
therefore able to influence the system in a more harmful way. Non-targeted attacks do not 
require such knowledge. DoS attacks many times can be considered non-targeted since these 
attacks do not require detailed knowledge of the NCS and, in particular, the physical system. All 
that is necessary is to stop communication.  Different types of DoS attacks are as follows based 
on how they work: compromising the nodes in the network, preventing the nodes from sending 
data, and flooding the network with packets [1].  
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For the scope of this work, it must be understood that the goal of the DoS attack would be 
to disable the control network. The control network connects various nodes associated with the 
process. Specifically, it links the controller to the plant. The DoS attack would thus hinder or 
completely block actuators from receiving commands from the controller. The DoS attack 
likewise impedes data sent from the sensor to the controller. As a result of this, actuators would 
not be able to respond to the plant correctly, which may lead to disastrous consequences. It 
should also be noted that the way the system responds to a DoS attack as far as the nodes are 
concerned is that the value in the last packet received in a node from another node is the one that 
is used. For instance, this might be the value for the sensor data contained in a packet that is last 
received by the controller. This was done it the work by Huang et al. [1]. 
 
Two Paradigms of Detection of Cyber-Attacks for SCADA Systems: 
In order to go about the problem of distinguishing attacks from faults, it is helpful to look 
at two main areas of research: (1) Fault Diagnosis; (2) Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).   
Fault Diagnosis is a process of detecting the presence of faults and isolating the faults in 
the system to determine what components have faults. Fault Diagnosis may include 
identification, which involves finding a quantitative measure of the fault’s magnitude [13] Fault 
Diagnosis is important because the techniques used in fault diagnosis may be applicable to 
detection of attacks. In fact, in some of the recent research, techniques from fault diagnosis are 
used [3]. The reason that Fault Diagnosis is important to understand is that a cyber-attack may 
cause the system to deviate from normal behavior in the physical system. This ability to detect 
when such a deviation occurs is very important for SCADA system security.  
Also, there is research concerning IDS, which are defined as systems which are used to 
determine if a computer system or network is compromised by malware so that the threat can be 
dealt with. This is done with the hope that the system would be able to return to its normal 
functioning state if the threat is detected and eliminated [24]. This research involves detection of 
anomalous network behavior. These techniques can also be used for SCADA systems. There is a 
paper that shows how these systems can be adapted for SCADA systems [35]. 
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Fault Diagnosis 
 In the literature of fault diagnosis, there have been many techniques that have been 
developed. [13] Some that are of particular interest are those that use model-based diagnosis, 
which as mentioned before, involves a simulation of the plant as the real plant goes about its 
operation and a comparison between the simulation and the real plant.  Model-based diagnosis 
generally involves a residual generator for diagnosis. The residual generator allows certain 
attributes of the signal or signature to be enhanced so that isolation can be performed in addition 
to detection.  In the case of this work, it is quite possible to use a residual generator, but as far as  
model-based diagnosis is concerned for this work, only detection is necessary. As for 
distinguishing one signature from another even in the physical system, possible methods could 
involve collecting some of the data from the physical system to be used as inputs to a machine 
learning algorithm [16]. 
 
Techniques used in IDS 
Anomaly detection is one method that IDS techniques can use. The main idea behind 
anomaly detection is that if there is behavior that deviates from normal behavior, then it can be 
determined that an anomaly is occurring. This detected anomaly would be a possible sign of a 
malicious attack. Many times, a supervised learning algorithm can be trained to recognize 
normal behavior. These algorithms can also be trained to recognize malicious behavior. Many of 
these algorithms that are used involve training where certain features that are based on data from 
the network or computer system are used in the training process [15]. 
It is necessary in this work to combine these two paradigms: One way of doing this 
would be to take information from the physical system and extract some of this data to be used as 
features to train the machine learning algorithm. These features can then be combined with 
features from the network so that it is possible to establish uniqueness between circumstances 
that are different in nature, but may be similar from the perspective of the physical system only. 
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Statistical Methods of Machine Learning 
It is the desire of this work to be able to understand the situations that the NCS 
experiences so that the data can be analyzed to make distinctions between attacks and faults. One 
key feature of an attack is that it may influence the behavior of the network in addition to the 
physical system, and therefore the behavior in the physical system is correlated with the behavior 
on the network.  What is noteworthy about a control network is that it is different from a 
standard corporate network in that the network exhibits regular behavior, meaning that a change 
in the network behavior could signal that a cyber-attack may be occurring. This is certainly true 
if the control network is separate from the corporate network. It can also be assumed true if there 
is a connection between the corporate network and the control network since in normal 
circumstances, the corporate network would not be allowed to disrupt the control network, or at 
least, the interaction would be hardly noticeable in terms of the network traffic. This may allow a 
distinction to be made, which a machine learning algorithm may be able to make if there are 
unique signatures associated with the different situations experienced by the NCS. These 
different situations may be said to fall under different classes or types of scenarios that the NCS 
experiences. For instance, three classes that would be appropriate for this work would be normal, 
fault, and attack. The machine learning algorithms that would classify the circumstance 
according to the data given are simply known as classifiers. One way to create a classifier for this 
work may be to use a naïve Bayes classifier [16], which could receive certain data from the 
system as features. The rationale for using Bayesian techniques would be that these techniques 
are also used for some intrusion detection systems. It is also the desire of this work to use a 
statistical approach to classification.   
The algorithm for a naïve Bayes classifier is a supervised learning algorithm. It is fairly 
accurate, although it may not be as accurate as more advanced Bayesian classifiers. An 
advantage that this classifier has that the work in [36] discusses is that it is not very 
computationally expensive. This classifier involves Bayes rule as the name implies and relies on 
an independence condition. For this, the attributes are assumed or treated as if they are not 
related. The classifier must be trained since it is a supervised learning algorithm. For this 
algorithm, the means and the variances are calculated for the attributes of the training data for 
each class. [36].  
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Suppose that there are q classes, then the following equation is used for the classification 
process.   
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(2.4) 
Where l is the class that the machine learning algorithm determines to best fit the testing data 
that it receives. Basically what the above formula means is that there is a set of functions 
calculated and the maximum is the one that is selected whose subscript is what l will equal. 
For the Naïve Bayes’s classier, 
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(2.5) 
The above equation is based on Bayes’ rule, where z is the evidence. Fi refers to a feature i. P is 
the Gaussian distribution, which is as follows: 
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(2.6) 
Where µ is the mean, and σ is standard deviation [37]. 
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Previous Work 
 
There are several papers in the literature that are related to this work: The paper by 
Cardinas et al. is one of the first papers that point out one of the main differences between 
SCADA security and general network and computer security. The SCADA system is different in 
that the physical system is involved, and therefore the behavior of the physical system should be 
taken into account.  In other work, it was mentioned that SCADA security is different because 
the networks and devices involved do not have the same computing capabilities as the computers 
used in general IT networks [2]. Litrico et al. discusses the isolation of faults and attacks and 
mentions the difficulties in doing so. 
  
22 
 
CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENTS 
In order to go about testing the ideas of distinguishing faults from attacks, a certain 
networked control system is modeled, and an implementation is created for simulations. Also, 
the methods for classifying unknown situations are discussed. 
Problem Formulation 
The scope of the problem encompasses a networked control system that is subject to 
various circumstances. Some of these circumstances include cyber-attacks that affect the 
physical system. They also include faults and normal operating conditions.  It should be noted 
and emphasized that the cyber-attacks of interest are the attacks that have an impact on the 
physical system. This type of impact is important to study because of its potential to cause 
danger in the physical world or its potential to cause inefficient operation for the networked 
control system. The physical world includes the plant and its physical environment. Other cyber-
attacks, which do not impact the physical system, are out of scope for this work. Those other 
types of cyber-attacks may be considered more or less benign in terms of the physical destruction 
that they cause but they may involve stealing information from the system. They could be an 
attack on confidentiality in other words.  One of the objectives of this work is to be able to detect 
abnormal behavior in the system due to attacks or faults. Detecting abnormal behaviors is similar 
to other work that has been done previously [2], [3], [4]. Furthermore, this work goes beyond 
detecting abnormal behavior. If abnormal behavior is detected, then it is desired to understand 
the nature of the circumstances responsible for this behavior; that is, it is desired to know what is 
causing the abnormality. It would be useful to know this information so that a more appropriate 
response can be used according to the type of abnormal situation. Therefore, it is important to 
diagnose the system further as a primary goal of this work and gain an understanding of the 
limitations in doing so as well. There are several aspects of this problem that will be discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 
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The Networked Control System 
The hypothetical networked control system (NCS) in this problem incorporates a plant 
and a controller, each of which is able to communicate to the other by means of a network in 
ordinary operating conditions. The communication is done using datagrams, or basic units of 
information that can be sent over the network [7], [8]. The plant sends datagrams over this 
network to the controller. These datagrams originate from the sensors associated with the plant 
and contain information concerning readings from those sensors. The controller, likewise, sends 
commands for the actuator associated with the plant by means of datagrams through the network. 
These datagrams sent by the controller to the plant are sent at regular intervals. Likewise, the 
datagrams sent by the plant to the controller are also sent at regular intervals. Therefore, under 
normal operating conditions, it can be assumed that the overall network traffic will be regular as 
far as its bandwidth utilization is concerned. Bandwidth can be defined as the amount of data that 
can be sent over the network in a given amount of time. Bandwidth utilization is how much of 
the bandwidth is being used and is typically represented as a percentage. The controller would 
enable the system to meet the control objectives, which can be defined as the desired result for 
the plant or the way that the plant is required to behave as it is manipulated by the controller 
[10]. As a control objective, it may be desired to have a variable associated with the plant to 
reach a certain setpoint or to have it track a time-varying reference signal. A diagram of the setup 
for the generic networked control system can be seen as follows:  
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Figure 3.1: Generic Networked Control System with a Controller, a Plant, and a Network Represented by a 
Cloud with Arrows that Represent Streams of Data 
 
In Figure 3.1, the boxes represent the plant and the controller. Also, in the figure is a 
cloud to represent the network. There are also arrows which indicate two streams of datagrams in 
the opposite directions between the controller and the plant. One stream is from the controller to 
the plant over the network. This stream contains commands for the actuators associated with the 
plant from the controller. The other stream is from the plant to the controller. The datagrams in 
this stream come from the plant’s sensors and are sent to the controller so that the controller can 
respond to meet the control objective it was designed for. Within the sensor stream, the plant 
sends these datagrams at a fixed sampling rate, and the datagrams are time-stamped. There is 
also a delay incurred as the datagram travels through the network. In addition, the controller 
sends datagrams at a fixed sampling rate as well. Therefore, the network has regular behavior as 
far as the traffic is concerned. 
The Specific Problem Selected 
It is important to note that Figure 3.1 shows a generic networked control system and not a 
concrete one. But, of course, a concrete one is best suited for the purposes of experimentation. 
More specifically, it is desired that a relatively simple networked control system be used for the 
experiments so that there is no unnecessary complexity beyond what is reasonable for a project 
such as this.  These situations include normal operation, and different cyber-attacks and faults. 
Controller Plant
Sensor Data
Actuator 
Commands
Network
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The specific networked control system chosen involved a fairly simple two-tank water system as 
the plant. This plant was regulated by a controller, and communication was facilitated by a 
simple network. It should be noted that this particular NCS will be described in more detail in the 
paragraphs that follow as well as the various situations that it can be subject to.  This specific 
NCS was chosen as opposed to a much more complex one such as the Tennessee Eastman 
Process Control System (TEP-CS) even though the TEP-CS is widely used in the literature. Its 
widespread use is evidenced by the fact that many of the papers associated with SCADA security 
use this system [1], [2], [5]. Using an overly complex system would mean that the faults and 
attacks may become very complex to simulate and lead to a large number of simulations that 
may become intractable for this work. 
The Plant: The two-tank system 
The plant chosen for these experiments is a two-tank system for water. A model of this system 
can be seen in Figure 3.2. It should be noted that this two-tank system is similar to one used in 
the thesis by Zhou [9]:  
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the Working Plant 
 
In Figure 3.2, there is a valve over the first tank, which opens to allow water to flow into 
the tank. This valve is the actuator for the plant that receives commands from the controller 
through the network. Also, at the bottom of the second tank is an outlet for the water. Between 
the two tanks is a pipe that links the tanks and allows water to flow from one to another. Initial 
conditions are such that both of the tanks start empty. There are two sensors associated with the 
plant, one for tank 1 and another for tank 2. These sensors measure the pressure of the water in 
the tanks. 
  
Tank 1 Tank 2
Q
in
Q
out
R1 R2
R12
p1 p2
C1 C2
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The tanks have certain dimensions and quantities associated with them. These include the 
cross sectional area of the tanks (A), the mass density of water (ρ), gravitational acceleration (g). 
There are certain quantities associated with the tanks-P1 and P2-which are the pressures at the 
bottoms of the tanks 1 and 2 respectively. C1 and C2 are capacitances of the tanks. The R12 is 
the resistance of the pipe between the tanks. R2 is the resistance of the pipe attached to tank 2 
that allows water to flow out. The pressures are the state variables for the state-space model of 
the system that will be derived. First of all it, it is necessary to establish the relationship between 
the pressure (P), the volumetric flow rate (Q), and the capacitance (C) for each tank: 
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(3.1) 
 
Where P1 and P2 are the pressures at the bottoms of the tanks 1 and 2 respectively, and QC1 and 
QC2 are the net flow rates of the tanks. 
The net flow rate for each tank is the following: 
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For tank 1, water can flow into the tank (Q1). Water can flow through the pipe between the tanks 
as well. QR12 is the volumetric flow of water out of tank 1 and into tank 2. 
The flow rates for the two tubes associated with the plant are as follows: 
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(3.3) 
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The two-tank system is actually a non-linear system. The resistance is not a constant with respect 
to the pressures in the tanks in reality.   However, in this work, the resistance is given as a 
constant to simplify an otherwise complicated system. Because it is a dynamic system, it is 
described by a set of differential equations, which are as follows:  
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These equations are written in linear state space form, Therefore P1 and P2 are the state variables. 
Also, for simulation purposes, it is necessary to use concrete values for the quantities associated 
with the model. The quantities chosen can be seen in the following table [42]:  
 Capacitance 
(m
4
s
2
/ kg) 
Resistance 
(N·s/m
5
) 
Tank C1 1.5708*10
-6 
- 
Tank C2 1.5708*10
-6 
- 
Tube R12 - 7.35*10
7 
Tube R2 - 1.45*10
8
 
Table 3.1: Values for Resistances and Capacitances 
Using the previous state space-model derived, the following equations can be determined with 
actual numerical values for the parameters. Fin is a variable that can range from 0 to 1. 
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The above equation (3.5) is expressed in continuous-time, and can be used directly in MATLAB 
Simulink for the behavior of the plant. 
The Controller 
 The controller for this project is a PI controller. The setpoint for this controller varies as a 
function of time. The controller receives values from the sensor for tank 2 and responds to the 
plant to meet the control objective, which is to have the level of the water in tank 2 track a time 
varying reference signal. Specifically, in this work, it is the pressure of tank 2 that is to track 
with the reference signal. The PI controller is implemented as a discrete-time controller for the 
actual implementation. The sampling rate is set at 100Hz.  This rate was chosen as an academic 
example, rather than a value that may be seen in an actual system.  
The reference signal is a piece-wise function defined by a set of equations. 
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The function F(t), which is used as the reference signal can also be seen in the following plot 
(Figure 3.3). 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Plot of Reference Signal 
 
Also, within the controller is an anomaly detection module (ADM) similar to the one used in the 
paper by Cardinas et al [2]. This part of the controller is implemented by using a simulated 
mathematical model of the plant. A comparison can be made between the ideal behavior of the 
plant as represented by the model and the behavior of the plant as indicated from information in 
the datagrams sent from the plant to the controller. It should be noted that the plant used in the 
simulations is itself a mathematical model as described previously, but it can be considered to be 
the “real plant.” The mathematical model that is implemented in the controller is a model of this 
“real plant” and can be viewed as a simulation within a simulation. This model is the same as Eq. 
3.4.  
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of the NCS with Topology Used in This Work 
 
Network 
 The following (Figure 3.5) is a diagram that shows the specific network topology that 
was chosen in this work. It was chosen so that there could be multiple routers. It was also chosen 
to be relatively simple. 
 
Figure 3.5: Illustration of the NCS with Topology Used in This Work 
 
There was a certain bandwidth associated with the network and delay as well. Each channel in 
the network has the following characteristics: datarate = 1.0Mps, and delay = 10us. Also, it is 
important to understand the datagrams that are used in this work. The datagrams can carry 
certain information through the network. This information included a timestamp that indicates 
the time they were created by the sensors. Also, these datagrams contained the sensor readings 
Samp. Plant Linear Model Buf.
ADM
Stored 
Data
For
Analysis
Samp. Controller
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that are sampled every 10ms. for the plant. Therefore, the datagrams are also sent every 10ms 
once they are created. The byte length of the datagrams is 20 Bytes. 
The controller receives this information from the plant over the network, which it then uses to 
update its variables that store the last values received, which is a similar setup to what was done 
in the paper by Huang et al [1].  
Possible situations 
For this work, certain situations that the networked control system can experience are 
studied. The situations can be categorized on three different levels as is illustrated in the 
following diagram in Figure 3.6. At the high level, they can be divided into two main categories:  
normal and abnormal. The abnormal scenarios can be further divided into faults and attacks, 
which are designated as the mid-level categories.  Both faults and attacks are studied in this work 
since both of them can impact the physical system. These mid-level categories can be further 
divided into more categories on the low level: For the faults, the low-level categories consist of a 
broken pipe, the small sensor bias, the large sensor bias, and the unresponsive actuator. For the 
attacks, the low-level categories are DoS flooding attacks, injection attacks on the controller, and 
injection attacks on the plant. The next paragraphs describe all of these categories on all three 
levels. 
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Figure 3.6: Three Levels of Categories of Situations (White shapes represent normal. Black shapes represent 
abnormal. Of the black shapes, squares represent faults, and triangles represent attacks) 
Normal 
Normal behavior would simply be defined as behavior that the system is designed to have 
without any influence from attacks or faults. If normal behavior is occurring, then there would 
ideally be no deviation from the simulated plant in the controller that is large enough to be 
considered unusual or abnormal by the SCADA system. For this case, the controller would be 
able to meet the control objective. 
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Abnormal  
Abnormal scenarios are defined as those in which the networked control system 
experiences situations that cause it to deviate from normal behavior. In some cases, this may 
cause chaotic and dangerous behavior for the physical system. These abnormal scenarios are 
divided into faults and attacks. 
Faults Faults are degradations in the plant that are accidental and not caused by a 
malicious entity. These faults can be due to damage in the physical plant. In addition to the faults 
that are related to the plant itself, faults can be associated with the sensor and the actuator [9], 
[10]. The faults in this work are all persistent, meaning that once they occur they will continue to 
have their effect throughout the operation of the plant or until the operation of the plant is 
stopped. At which point, the problem can be addressed. 
Faults in the Plant: Damaged Pipe  One of the faults could be a damaged pipe between 
the two tanks. If this occurs in the plant, the model for the plant must change to account for the 
leak that is introduced, which will cause a change of behavior in the dynamics of the plant.  
Therefore, two mathematical models for this system must be used: One for a working plant and 
one for a damaged plant.  This would mean that this plant is a hybrid system. A hybrid system 
incorporates both discrete states and continuous states. The plant would start in the working 
discrete state and therefore would use the mathematical model of the plant associated with that 
state. In the event that the pipe breaks, there would be a change of state to the other discrete state.  
However, there would be no change back to the original discrete state during continuous 
operation of the plant. If the pipe is to be repaired, continuous operation would be stopped before 
the repairs can take place. It should be noted that the instant that the model changes, the state 
variables associated with the continuous model would remain unchanged. In other words, the 
water levels in the tanks remain the same at the very instant that the pipe becomes broken. But as 
time progresses, the levels in the water would change according to the new model. For the case 
of this project, since the standard state space equations were used, the parameters in this new 
model would be different than those of the working model. The model would change such that 
the pressure in tank 1 would not affect the pressure in tank 2. Likewise, the pressure in tank 2 
would no longer affect the pressure in tank 1. The reason for this is that tank 1 and tank 2 no 
longer have a pipe to link them together, which allows water to flow so that pressure is 
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transferred from one tank to another. Therefore, the plant can be visualized by the following 
figure.  
 
 
Figure 3.7: Illustration of Broken Plant 
 
where Rb1 and Rb2 are the new resistances for the broken pipe.  
 
Tank 1 Tank 2
Fin
Fout
R1 R2
Rb1
p1 p2
C1 C2
Rb2
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The state space equations would then become the following: 
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(3.8) 
It should be noted that the A matrix (This matrix found in Equation 2.3 in Chapter 2 for the 
general form of state space equation) of the state space equation has zeros on the off-diagonal 
entries. This is because pressure 1 no longer affects pressure 2 and vice-versa as was mentioned 
since there is a leak. Equation (3.8) expressed with the numerical values for the parameters is as 
follows Equation 3.9: 
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(3.9) 
Faults in the Actuator There are also faults that can occur with the actuator. One possible 
fault for the actuator is the actuator becoming stuck or a situation where it does not respond to 
commands. For this particular fault, the valve that is used as the actuator in this project remains 
at its current position. 
Faults in the Sensors Other faults include faults with the sensors. For instance, it is 
possible for there to be a bias in the sensor readings. This could be due to mis-calibration. For 
this type of fault, constant biases were added to both signals that are generated by the sensors.  
These biases are introduced at some start time, and the bias persists throughout the rest of the 
simulation. Therefore, each of these biases can be represented as a step function with a certain 
delay once the simulation starts. There were two biases that were used in this work. The signal 
due to the “small” bias was 5,000Pa (50% of the highest value of Reference Signal) less than 
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what it should have read once the fault occurs.  The signal with the “large” bias was 10000 Pa 
(100% of highest value of Ref. Signal) less than what it should have indicated. 
Attacks Some of the possible attacks that can influence the behavior of the system 
include DoS attacks, and injection attacks.    
DoS Attacks The DoS attacks can prevent the network from allowing communication 
between the plant and the controller. This can be achieved by flooding of a network with 
datagrams. Because of this flooding of datagrams, legitimate traffic would not be able to flow. 
This would mean that traffic from the real sensor to the controller would not be able to reach the 
controller.  As a result, the NCS is prevented from functioning properly. This would also be true 
for traffic from the controller to the actuator. 
Injection Attacks Injection attacks were also used in this work. For these injection attacks, 
malicious datagrams that appear to be legitimate would be sent to either the controller or the 
plant in order to manipulate the behavior of the NCS. These datagrams that are directed to the 
controller will have false information for the sensor readings. Likewise, these datagrams that are 
directed toward the actuator will have commands for malicious purposes. The plant or controller, 
of course, will respond according to the information sent to it. If the plant consists of tanks for 
water or tanks that contain some other liquid in it, it may make sense from the attacker’s 
standpoint to influence the system such that the tanks overflow. The attacker could achieve this 
by sending datagrams with commands to keep the valve open in the plant. Therefore, the attacker 
may desire to inject datagrams with values to the actuator associated with the plant to keep the 
valve open.  If the attacker is sending packets to the controller, the attacker would desire to send 
datagrams to cause the sensor readings to appear deceptively low. Therefore, the controller will 
respond by sending the datagrams to cause the valves to be opened more, which may eventually 
cause the tank to overflow.    
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Variations in Scenarios 
It should also be noted that there were variations among the different scenarios, 
specifically in the low-level categories illustrated in Figure 3.6. These scenarios were those with 
faults and attacks. If they occurred in reality, these abnormal situations could start at any time 
and end at any time.  Because of this, for a real NCS, there would be an infinite number of 
possible combinations of start times and end times even for a single occurrence of an attack or 
fault lasting for one period during the simulation. Despite this, it is still desired for the attacks to 
have different start times and end times associated with them for these different variations in the 
experiments during the operation of the NCS. Also, it is desired for the faults to have different 
start times associated with them and to persist throughout the simulation. Therefore, it is 
necessary to have a way of reducing the potentially infinite set of possibilities to a finite set for 
experimental purposes such that the whole space of possible simulations would still be covered. 
To achieve this, there were certain points designated for the start times and end times in the 
simulation period set at equal intervals from one another. It was therefore possible to create a 
finite set of all possible combinations of start times and end times restricted to these designated 
points. For the case of this work the set of designated points in terms of seconds into the 
simulation is the following: {60, 204, 348, 492, 636, 780}. Each set of start times and end times 
is such that the period of the attack or fault is at least the smallest period, which is defined as the 
period between two of these points which are adjacent. The following images illustrate these 
variations. Each of the low-level categories of the attacks had 15 variants of start times and end 
times. This is illustrated in the following table, which gives the start time, the end time, and 
period for each variant (Table 3.2).  
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Variant for Attack Categories 
Variant Start Time(sec) End Time (sec) Period (secs) 
1 60 204 144 
2 204 348 144 
3 348 492 144 
4 492 636 144 
5 636 780 144 
6 60 348 288 
7 204 492 288 
8 348 636 288 
9 492 780 288 
10 60 492 432 
11 204 636 432 
12 348 780 432 
13 60 636 576 
14 204 780 576 
15 60 780 720 
Table 3.2: Attack Variants based on Start Time and End Time for Each Low-Level Category. 
 
In addition to this, there are 5 variants for the faults since only the start times are varied (Table 
3.2). The end times are not varied because they are assumed to be persistent, meaning they will 
last until the end of the simulation.  
 
Varient Start Time (sec) End Time (sec)
1 60 780
2 204 780
3 348 780
4 492 780
5 636 780
Variants for Fault Categories
 
Table 3.3: Fault Variants for Each Start Time and End Time for Each Low-Level Category 
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In addition, the following table shows the number of variations for each of the low-level 
categories and their combined sum, which is referred to in the table in bold text as the “Total 
Unique Scenarios”.  
High Level Mid Level Low Level Num of Varients per low -level class
Normal Normal Normal 1
Abnormal
Faults
Damaged Plant 5
Small Sensor Bias 5
Large Sensor Bias 5
Actuator Stuck 5
Attacks
DoS Flooding 15
Injection to Plant 15
Injection to Controller 15
Total Unique Scenarios: 66
Classification Scheme
Table 3.4: All Unique Scenarios Used 
 
It is especially important to note that when using a time-varying reference signal, it is 
necessary to use attacks and faults that start at different times since they have different effects on 
the NCS. It is also reasonable to vary the end times for attacks as well so that the lengths of the 
periods of the attacks can be different. 
Symptoms 
The major goal of this work is to be able to diagnose what type of situation the SCADA 
system is experiencing if there is abnormal behavior. The recent work [2], [3], [4] that has been 
done involves observing the system in order to detect whether there is an anomaly in its behavior 
in the physical system. In this work, something similar to this was done, but more was done so 
that it can be determined whether the anomaly is due to an attack or fault.  More information 
would have to be gathered from the NCS to make this determination. Such necessary information 
would include information from the network as well, such as the inter-arrival time of packets, the 
network traffic, whether the controller was updated with new information, etc. Therefore, the 
behavior of the system can be observed by collecting information from the physical system and 
the network.  In the networked control system, it is possible that either the behavior in the 
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physical system, the network, or both may be affected. An abnormal situation, whatever it may 
be, would influence the system a certain way depending on the nature of the abnormal situation. 
By using the information that is collected, certain symptoms associated with the network control 
system may be seen. Different types of abnormalities would have different sets of symptoms 
associated with them. For the purposes of this work, these sets of symptoms can also be referred 
to as the signatures. If these signatures for the different abnormal situations are unique then it is 
possible to distinguish one abnormal situation from another. Therefore, if a specific abnormal 
situation occurs, it is possible to classify that situation into a certain category. There are several 
symptoms that are of interest. One would be a deviation of the behavior of the plant according to 
sensor data from a simulated model of the nominal plant. Other symptoms may be changes in 
network activity. In this work, there are three different levels of categories for scenarios. It would 
thus be desired ideally to categorize the status of the NCS correctly on each level. 
Implementation of the experiments 
Implementing the Models in Software 
The equations referred to in the previous section cannot be directly used in C++ very 
easily since they are in continuous form and are therefore not suitable for simulations of a digital 
system. Therefore, these equations must be transformed into discrete equations. There are 
mathematical formulas to allow for this transformation.  The author of this work did not use 
these methods directly, but instead relied on MATLAB scripts with certain commands to 
generate a new set of equations in discrete form from the continuous equations. The resulting 
equations are as follows along with the appropriate matrices: The discrete state space equations 
for the two-tank system with the pipe undamaged at 100HZ: 
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(3.9) 
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It should also be noted that equation 3.9 is also used to implement that model in the ADM of the 
controller to serve as a basis of comparison. The discrete state space equations for the two-tank 
system with the pipe damaged, also at 100HZ: 
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(3.10) 
Similarly, it was necessary to create a discrete control algorithm for the controller with the 
correct parameters for the control law. This was also done using MATLAB. Basically, a model 
of the discrete plant was made in Simulink. In addition, a discrete controller was used for it. 
MATLAB has a feature in Simulink that allows for the tuning of the parameters of the controller. 
Using this feature, the author tuned this controller as it was connected to the plant such that it 
had a certain response time. This response was chosen to be 50 seconds. As a result of this 
tuning, parameters were obtained from the MATLAB Simulink model that could be used for the 
controller in the actual implementation for the simulations. The simulations were done in 
Omnet++ and INET [17], [18]. Here is the model created in MATLAB: 
 
Figure 3.8: MATLAB Implementation of the Experiments 
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Simulation Software 
Special software was used to run simulations with the various scenarios. Omnet++ and 
INET were chosen as libraries and frameworks that are based in C++ [6]. Omnet++ is a helpful 
tool for simulating networks. It is a general purpose simulator.  INET is a library for that 
simulator that can be used for creating networks with sophisticated routers and protocols, such as 
UDP, TCP, etc.  Omnet++ was specifically used for this work because it allows for the creation 
of simulated networks with nodes whose applications can serve as the plant or the controller. 
Although it is possible to simulate the plant and the controller in MATLAB, MATLAB does not 
have the tools that Omnet++ provides for networks. It should be noted, however, that there are 
some tools that allow for something resembling network behavior for MATLAB. TrueTime is 
one of them [39]. TrueTime is a simulator made for Matlab/Simulink to allow for simulations of 
networks with delays.  Also, there has been work done with SimEvents to simulate packets being 
forwarded through a network link, experiencing DDoS Attacks [13]. But these tools were not 
quite suitable for the purposes of this work since it was desired to use a more sophisticated 
network simulator that allowed for more elaborate simulation, one that would involve routing 
packets to their destinations. Omnet++ is capable of doing such simulations. If such a simulator 
is to be used, the question of how to implement the plant and controller then arises since 
Omnet++ does not have tools that are specifically tailored for simulations of control systems like 
MATLAB. It should be noted that work has been done in the literature to integrate MATLAB 
and Omnet++ with certain simulation environments, such as C2WindTunnel that enables them to 
interface with one another [15]. However to use such an environment in this work may cause the 
simulations to be unnecessarily complex. Therefore, it was decided to add C++ code to the 
applications that would implement the behavior of the plants and the controller. The plant 
application implements the discrete equations for the plant. The state of the plant is updated at 
regular intervals of simulated time. The discrete equations are chosen using the MATLAB tools 
discussed for this specific interval of simulation time. In the case of this work, this interval of 
time that was chosen was 10ms as mentioned previously. This is referred to as the step time. 
When the controller was tuned in MATLAB, it was specified in the settings that the states of the 
plant would be updated every 10ms.  
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Omnet++, in conjunction with INET, allows for the creation of models of networks that 
can be simulated. It allows for simulations with the standard protocols found in networks, which 
include UDP and TCP, etc. The UDP protocol was used in this work. Within Omnet++ and 
INET, the user can create the topology of the network for the simulations and store them as NED 
files, which are also known as network description files. Both the controller and the plant are 
implemented in C++. This code is used as applications for the nodes that are connected to the 
network within the Omnet++ simulation environment. 
The Simulations and How They are Used 
First, the large set of the unique 66 simulations were performed using Omnet++/INET to 
generate the data associated with the NCS. This data was created in the form of CSV files. Then, 
two main things were done with the data. The first part deals with studying the data generated by 
the scenarios to gain an intuitive sense of their behavior. The reason for doing this first is to 
observe the potential harm to the system that these attacks and faults can cause. Another reason 
is to be able to understand intuitively how certain circumstances affect certain variables 
associated with the system. Then it can be understood what are the symptoms associated with a 
particular circumstance. The second part of the experiments deals with using a machine learning 
algorithm, which is included in MATLAB, so that experiments with classification can be done to 
determine how well a distinction can be made between different classes of scenarios. The 
following is a diagram that illustrates this setup: 
 
Figure 3.9: Diagram illustrating the Overall Experiments, where Omnet++/INET generates the 
simulation CSV Data; MATLAB extracts/compresses the data in the form of a matrix with features as 
columns and rows as scenarios  to be used by the Machine Learning Algorithm for diagnosis.  
Simulate
Unique
scenarios 
Extract and
compress
data
Process in
Machine 
Learning
Algorithm
Matrix
CSV 
Data
Traces
MATLABOmnet++/INET
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Before using the machine learning algorithm, the data must be processed so that a certain 
very small subset can be extracted from the large set of data.  This very small subset would then 
be used to train a Naïve Bayes Classifier. The data that are extracted would be fed as features to 
the classifier. The purpose of conducting experiments with a Naïve Bayes Classifier would be to 
test the ability for a well-known machine learning algorithm to classify these circumstances 
given their data. There is something that must be mentioned that is specific to the Naïve Bayes 
classifier: For this classifier, it must be trained using a set of features. These features come from 
the data. For instance, the data that is extracted from the CSV files that are created by the 
simulations. Data are written to CSV files as the simulations run. These CSV files contain 
columns of data for pressures in the tanks, the deviation of the tank 1 from the ideal tank, etc. 
The features, which are derived from this data, can then be used to train the classifier. 
It is necessary to label the simulations from which the data is produced. This is done for 
the training phase according to the categories that the simulations fall under, since this is a 
supervised learning algorithm. There are three ways that the data is labeled in this work. This is 
according to the three levels of categories discussed previously. The first way is simple in that it 
only uses “1” for normal and “2” for abnormal. It is important to be able to know whether the 
system is experiencing abnormal behavior since the possibility that such behavior is destructive 
exists, regardless of how it occurred.  The second way of labeling the data is to use “1” for 
normal, “2” for fault, and“3” for attack to have three classes. For this second way to classify the 
situations experienced by the system, attacks and faults are two separate classes in addition to 
normal behavior. It is desired that a distinction can be made between faults and attacks based on 
the features fed into the classifier. It should be noted that the signature of the attacks and faults as 
represented by the features given to the classifier must be statistically different from one another 
to allow for a diagnosis. It is also possible to break down each of the categories on the second 
level (normal, fault, attack) into subcategories. These subcategories would be on the third level 
of the tree.  Once the classifier is trained, the test set of the data can be used. It is important to 
understand how the results will be generated, in the case of the experiments. It is also important 
to understand these results for the case that there is an actual implementation. The results of the 
testing class may be considered as a form of status update in which the user of the system is told 
the most likely situation that the system appears to be experiencing. The most important piece of 
information that the user is told is whether there is abnormal behavior occurring in the system. 
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The next important thing that the user must know is whether the behavior is due to a fault or an 
attack.  What is important for the features is that the most important characteristics of the system 
are captured such that different scenarios would be seen as statistically different from the others. 
In order to determine what features should be included; it is useful to gain an intuitive sense of 
the behavior of the system. This can be achieved through observing the results of the 
simulations. As was mentioned, because there is an enormous amount of information produced 
by the simulations, a subset must be extracted from these simulations, or a small set of values 
must be calculated from the data. For the features, it would make sense to include data that 
would be most useful in determining that there is an abnormality in the system. One useful piece 
of information from the system would be the maximum deviation of the sensor values.  The 
deviation is determined by the anomaly detection module in the controller. It would make sense 
to divide the simulation into “windows.”  In the case of this project, the simulation is divided 
into 10 windows.  The maximum can be taken as a feature from each window. The following is a 
figure to illustrate this: 
 
Figure 3.10: Plot of the Reference Signal with the Simulations Divided into Windows 
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Suppose that m features are extracted from each “window” in a given simulation. Windows in 
this work will be defined as equal time intervals of the simulation. If there are n windows then 
m*n features can be fed into the classifier. This set of futures that are derived from the 
simulation data can be considered a compressed version of that data, where the features represent 
the most important or useful characteristics of that data. It may be useful to see one simulation as 
one cycle of some pattern of behavior for this system, especially if there is a time-varying 
reference signal. This signal may be periodic. The information generated by the simulations is 
from the perspective of the controller. The reason that this setup was chosen is that a similar 
setup was chosen in the paper [2]. In this paper, there was an anomaly detector, which is similar 
to what is done in this work. The anomaly detector in that work incorporated a mathematical 
model of the plant in the controller which was simulated. This was done so that a comparison 
could be made between the simulated model’s sensor readings and the sensor readings from the 
datagrams that were sent over the network. Of course, the controller would also have to feed the 
actuator commands into its simulation model that it is sending the actual plant. This difference 
between the ideal behavior and the behavior as indicated by the sensors could be recorded by the 
controller as a function of time, not a continuous function of time but a function of discrete time. 
This alone may not be perfect for analyses. It may be necessary to filter out noise from this. But 
it is important to realize that this difference gives a symptom for abnormality, which alone would 
not always allow for the distinction to be made between faults and attacks since both faults and 
attacks can cause similar deviation. A larger difference is more likely to indicate an abnormal 
situation than a smaller difference which may be seen as being within some noise margin. As 
was mentioned, other pieces of data are also needed. Such data would have to allow for a 
distinction to be made between a fault and an attack. This type of data that would allow for this 
distinction would most likely be information associated with the network. It may not be possible 
in all cases to use information from the network, but in some cases it certainly can. This 
information includes the inter-arrival time of packets received by the controller, and also the 
traffic on the network.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
In this chapter, the results of the experiments are presented and described so that the 
effects of various situations on the NCS can be understood and conclusions can be drawn as to 
how these different situations can be distinguished. There are two main parts to this chapter:  
In the first part, a subset of the scenarios, which are described in the previous chapter, is 
studied.  The subset contains scenarios that fall under all of the low-level categories of the 
scenarios. These scenarios are studied by observing plotted data from the simulations to gain 
insight into the various behaviors of the NCS due to the effects of various operating conditions 
that the NCS is subject to. Some of this insight is also gained through knowledge of control 
systems, networks, etc.  It is desired to understand the various signatures or symptoms that might 
be associated with these conditions, or specifically how the conditions manifest themselves to a 
supervisory system. This can be seen in the data or lack of data that this system receives. In the 
case of this project, this supervisory system would simply be the device which has the control 
algorithm implemented in it, along with the ADM, which was discussed in the previous chapter.  
In the second part, the data generated from all the scenarios were processed, and features 
were extracted from the data to train a naïve Bayes classifier. The features were chosen 
heuristically such that they capture the important aspects of the data. It is important to capture 
certain aspects of the data such that a distinction can be made between scenarios of different 
categories. The term “categories” refers to the way the scenarios are divided according to 
Chapter 3.   In order to train the supervised learning algorithm, each scenario is labeled based on 
the categories that the scenario falls under.  There are three main ways that the scenarios are 
labeled, and this is done according to the hierarchy of categories.  The goal for this part of the 
experiments is to assess how well a distinction can be made between the various types of 
circumstances that the networked control system may experience using a well known machine 
learning algorithm.  
The results of these two parts of the experiments are shown in this chapter. Also, a 
discussion and an analysis are included.  
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Part I: Behavior of the Networked Control System Subject to Various Circumstances 
 
As was mentioned, it is desired to study some of the simulated scenarios to gain an 
understanding of their various behaviors. Plots were created in order to observe this behavior 
graphically. What follows are the plots to illustrate all 8 of the low-level categories (The normal 
case and two selected scenarios from each of the seven abnormal low-level categories).  They 
were chosen such that all the abnormal cases have the same start time and end time for when the 
abnormal situation occurs. This was done so that a comparison could be made between attacks 
and faults as far as their behavior in the physical system is concerned.  The plots of the scenarios 
are broken down as follows: First, the normal scenario’s plots are shown and described. Then 
two sets of scenarios of the abnormal low-level categories are discussed with a set of plots.  The 
first set of these abnormal scenarios have the start time for the onset of the abnormal 
circumstances at 348 sec. The second set of these abnormal scenarios has the start time at 492 
sec. These times were chosen because they occur when the reference signal is sloping upward 
and downward respectively.  The pressure in Tank 2 must track the reference signal according to 
the control objective. For this part of the results, it should be noted that there are certain variables 
that are studied which are associated with the NCS. These variables are as follows and are 
indicative of the behavior of the network: (1) The Actual Behavior is the true behavior of the 
pressures of the tanks over time. (2) The perceived behavior is the behavior that the supervisory 
system observes from the sensor data that this supervisory system receives. (3) Deviation is 
defined as the difference between the perceived behavior and the nominal behavior. (4) Nominal 
behavior is defined as the simulated behavior for the ideal plant. This simulation is performed in 
the ADM of the supervisory system and serves as a basis for comparison.   
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Figure 4.1: Legend for the Following Plots of the Data Associated with Tanks 1 and 2 [(a) and (b) respectively.] 
 
Figure 4.2: Simulation 1 - Normal Operating Conditions  
 
Above is the normal scenario (Figure 4.2). On the left (a) and on the right (b) are plots of 
the actual pressures of Tanks 1 and 2 over time respectively (black line in plots (a) and (b)). It 
should be noted that these pressures can be considered the “real” pressures of the system. In 
other words, the data used is taken directly from the plant so that the true behavior of the system 
can be understood. It should be noted that the controller does not see this data directly, but only 
sees the data that it receives, which is “the perceived behavior” (red line in plots (a) and (b)). 
Also, the plots show the deviations for Tank 1 and 2 (blue line in plots (a) and (b)). The data for 
these two previously mentioned plots are data that the controller actually has or calculates based 
on the data that in receives. The deviation is defined as the difference between the perceived 
behavior of Tank 1(2) and the nominal behavior, which is simulated in the ADM. This 
simulation within the controller is implemented in the ADM, as described in the experimental 
setup in Chapter 3. Because the deviations are relatively small (Deviation < 3% of maximum 
value used for pressure in the simulations) for both tanks, they appear as noise in the plots.  Also, 
the fact that the deviations are insignificant in magnitude is a sign that there are no abnormal 
circumstances present. If, however, the data points of the plots for the deviations take positive 
values that are significantly greater than zero beyond any reasonable noise margin, then that 
would be an indication of abnormal behavior. Also the network behavior for these simulations 
remains constant throughout, meaning that the network has no abnormalities. This is an 
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indication of no network faults and no cyber-attacks. The network behavior can be characterized 
by its network utilization over time, which is steady for the normal case as would be expected for 
a networked control system as mentioned previously. Also, whether the controller is updated or 
not is also important information for characterizing the network behavior. 
As was mentioned, a set of abnormal scenarios were selected from the 66 unique 
scenarios such that the onset of the abnormal situations begins at 348 sec. What follows are the 
plots that have been generated from the simulations of these scenarios. Also, these scenarios are 
discussed. After this set, an additional set is plotted and discuss where the onset of the abnormal 
scenarios begins at 492 sec. 
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First Set of Selected Scenarios (Onset = 348 sec):  Faults – Simulations 4, 9, 14, 19   
 
Figure 4.3: Legend for the Following Plots of the Data Associated with Tanks 1 and 2 [(a) and (b) respectively.] 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Simulations 4 - Actuator Stuck (Onset of Fault = 348 sec.)  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Simulation 9 - Small Sensor Bias (Onset of Fault = 348 sec.)  
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Figure 4.6: Legend for the Following Plots of the Data Associated with Tanks 1 and 2 [(a) and (b) respectively]. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Simulation 14 - Big Sensor Bias (Onset of Fault = 348 sec.)  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Simulation 19 – Damaged Plant (Onset of Fault = 348 sec.)  
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Faults for the First Set: 
  
These faults have a few things in common as far as their symptoms are concerned: (1) 
The network behavior is essentially the same as the normal case discussed previously. This is to 
be expected since the network is not manipulated or interfered with in any way. (2) There is 
abnormal behavior in the physical system as seen in the deviation, which is a measure of how the 
perceived behavior differs from what is expected according to the simulated behavior in the 
ADM. What should be noted is that the behavior of the deviation or the shape of its graph may 
vary for different faults. 
 
Simulation 4:  Actuator Stuck: In this scenario, (figure 4.4) where the actuator becomes 
stuck, the valve is no longer responsive and remains in the open position for the rest of the 
simulation. Therefore, water will flow into tank 1 and continue to do so during the operation of 
the NCS as seen from the actual behavior (black line (a) and (b)) and the perceived behavior (red 
line (a) and (b)). Water will also flow from Tank 1 and Tank 2. It should be noted that once the 
inflow from tank 1 to tank 2 equals the outflow, then the pressure in tank 2 will approach a 
specific constant. Because of this, the behavior diverges from the nominal behavior simulated in 
the ADM. This is evidenced by the fact that the deviation takes on positive values. At some 
points, the deviation is equal to zero. This is because the simulated behavior happens to be equal 
to the perceived behavior at some points in time. This is certainly not an indication that the 
behaviors are the same at those points since these behaviors are changing over time. In other 
words, they are dynamic in nature and not static. Therefore, it is important to understand this 
behavior over the course of time rather than at a single point only. The change of deviation with 
respect to time may also be determined so that the dynamic nature of the behavior can be 
captured. This is important for a machine learning algorithm since this information concerning 
the change of behavior can be used as a feature for this algorithm. This will be discussed in Part 
II of the results. It should also be noted that the network behavior is essentially no different than 
the normal case, meaning that the controller received updated packets and the network traffic is 
fairly constant. 
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Simulations 9, 14: Sensor Bias (Small and Large): These two scenarios are essentially 
the same in nature, but one has the effect of the fault greater than the other so that there can be 
variation in the experiments. For simulation 9 (the small bias), there is a bias that causes the 
sensor values in the packets to be 5000 Pa (Pascal) lower than they actually are. The plots of the 
deviation show these biases on the sensors. The deviation increased from being merely noise to 
having a higher value once the fault occurred. It also remained at the higher level. This 
abnormality can be detected by the ADM in the controller, which calculates the deviation. For 
simulation 14 (the large bias seen in figure 4.7), the bias causes pressure of the water to appear 
10000 PA lower than they actually are, and is similar to the previous scenario. The plots of the 
deviations show this. Like the last scenario, the values are larger than they ought to be.  
For both of these scenarios, the controller responds to the values that it receives from the 
sensors by taking the control action that would seem to be appropriate based on those values. In 
reality, the pressure is higher than what the sensors indicate. Therefore, when the controller 
receives the incorrect values for the pressure from the network, it will respond such that those 
lower values will track the reference signal. As a result, the actual pressure will not track the 
reference signal but instead will be higher. The plots of tank 1 and 2 illustrate this behavior.  
 
Simulation 19: Damaged Plant: For this simulation: The pipe is broken (figure 4.8). 
Therefore, there is a leak in the plant, meaning water cannot move from tank 1 to tank 2. As a 
result, the second tank does not have pressure that can track the reference signal. Tank 1 is 
constantly being filled, but it does not affect tank 2. If tank 2 has any water in it, then the water 
in tank 2 will simply be emptied out once the pipe has become broken. The controller is designed 
such that it will continue to send commands via the network to the actuator so that the valve is 
open because this action in normal circumstances would cause the pressure in tank 2 to track the 
reference signal. But as the water goes into tank 1, it can never reach tank 2.  Therefore tank 2 is 
not able to track with the reference signal of the controller. Tank 1 will continue to be filled with 
water as a result. 
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First Set of Selected Scenarios (Onset = 348 sec):  Attacks – Simulations 33, 48, 63 
 
Figure 4.9: Legend for the Following Plots of the Data Associated with Tanks 1 [(a) and (b) respectively].   
 
 
Figure 4.10: Simulation 33 – DoS Flooding Attack  (Onset of Fault = 348 sec)  
 
 
Figure 4.11: Simulation 48 – Injection Attack on the Controller (Onset of Fault = 348 sec.)  
 
 
Figure 4.12: Simulation 63 – Injection Attack on the Plant (Onset of Fault = 346 sec.)  
 
57 
 
 
Attacks in the First Set 
 
Cyber-attacks may influence the network in order to carry out their objective. Therefore, 
it is important to not only observe the deviation over time, but also the network behavior in terms 
of its network utilization and whether the controller is updated with a new datagram that is 
correctly formatted. For each of the discussions of the simulations, the network behavior will be 
described. 
 
Simulation 33: DoS Flooding Attack: For this attack (Figure 4.10), after the valve is 
open, the attack is started. The set-point is higher than the pressure at that point as seen by the 
controller. The controller will continue to hold that sensor reading until it is updated.  Therefore, 
the controller responds by sending commands to open the valves of the controller and keep them 
open. The valve will remain open until it receives another command to change its state. But 
during the DoS attack, communication stops for the duration of the attack. It should also be noted 
that the behavior behaves abnormally according to the deviations for the two tanks. What is also 
notable is that the controller is not updated with a new datagram from sensors of the plant during 
the duration of the attack. This can be seen by the observed network behavior in that the 
controller receives no updated packets with new sensor readings during the period of the DoS 
attack, which in the figure will be between the vertical dash-dot lines in figure 4.10. During the 
attack the network utilization goes to 0% 
 
Simulation 48: Injection attack on the Controller: For this simulation, datagrams with 
false values for the sensor readings are sent to the controller (Figure 4.11). These values are 
deceptively low, so that the controller would respond by sending a command to open the valves 
and add more water to the tanks.  The network activity as seen from the controller becomes 
higher than usual because of the increased datagrams in the network. In order for the attacker to 
be successful, there would have to be a large number of datagrams in the network in order to 
overwhelm the network preventing the legitimate data from being sent to the controller. 
Observing the network activity would aid in distinguishing this type of attack from certain types 
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of faults, such as the sensor bias, which may have a signature similar to this attack as far as the 
physical system is concerned.  
With regard to the network behavior, a few things should be noted: (1) The controller 
receives a datagram which will update the controller via the network.  It is possible that many of 
these datagrams could be from a malicious entity. (2) The network behavior has a much greater 
network utilization during the time of the attack. When the attack does occur the utilization is 
58% as opposed to 1.6% when the attacks do not occur.   
 
Simulation 63: Injection attack on the Plant: For this set of experiments, commands 
from a malicious entity are sent to the plant (4.12). The packets from the malicious entity contain 
commands that cause the valve to be open, which may be contrary to the commands that the 
controller would send. The packets coming from the malicious entity are sent at such a high 
frequency that they overwhelm any legitimate packets from the controller. Therefore, tank 1 is 
constantly filled with water. 
 As far as the network behavior is concerned, the controller is constantly updated with 
datagrams. The network utilization also is different for when the attack takes place (33.5% as 
opposed to 1.6% in the normal case) (This occurs between the dash-dot lines). 
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Second Set of Selected Scenarios (Onset = 492 sec):  Faults – Simulations 5, 10, 15, 20 
 
Figure 4.13: Legend for the Following Plots of the Data Associated with Tanks 1 and 2 [(a) and (b) respectively].   
 
 
Figure 4.14: Simulations 5 - Actuator Stuck (Onset of Fault = 492 sec.) 
 
 
 Figure 4.15: Simulation 10 - Small Sensor Bias (Onset of Fault = 492 sec.) 
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Figure 4.16: Legend for the Following Plots of the Data Associated with Tanks 1 and 2  [(a) and (b) respectively.] 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Simulation 15 - Big Sensor Bias (Onset of Fault = 492 sec.) 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Simulation 20 – Damaged Plant (Onset of Fault = 492 sec.) 
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Faults in the Second Set 
  
This is similar to the first set in that the network activity has no abnormalities, but the 
physical system does have anomalous behavior according to the plot of deviation, which takes on 
positive values that are higher than a mere noise level. The shape of the deviation may be unique 
for different faults. 
 
Simulation 5: Actuator Stuck: The plots for this simulation (Figure 4.14) show the 
actuator becoming stuck. Therefore, the flow of water going into the tank remains a constant 
because it does respond to new commands. There will be a certain point in which the pressure in 
the tanks converges such that the inflow equals the outflow for the water. 
 
Simulations 10, 15: Sensor bias (small and large): For simulation of the small sensor 
bias (Figure 4.15), the effects of a sensor bias fault are observed. It can be seen that the pressure 
becomes higher than it is supposed to. This simulation of the large sensor bias (Figure 4.17) is 
similar to the previous scenarios but the effect is greater. As far as the physical system is 
concerned when compared with that of the previous set, the difference is that the deviation is 
simply delayed more for second for when it abruptly changes to a higher value. 
 
Simulation 20: Damaged Plant: The simulation (Figure 4.18) as seen by the graphs is 
similar to the damaged plant when there was an upward slope in the reference signal. Between 
this set and the first set, the behavior for the damaged plant is similar for the physical system.  
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Second Set: The Attacks (Onset of attacks = 492 sec.)–Simulations 30, 45, 60 
 
Figure 4.19: Legend for the Following Plots of the Data Associated with Tanks 1 [(a) and (b) respectively.] 
 
  
 
Figure 4.20: Simulation 30 – DoS Flooding Attack (Onset of Fault = 492 sec.) 
 
Figure 4.21: Simulation 45 – Injection Attack on the Controller (Onset of Fault = 492 sec.) 
 
 
Figure 4.22: Simulation 60 – Injection Attack on the Plant (Onset of Fault = 492 sec.) 
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Attacks in the Second Set 
For the above attacks, like the previous set, the scenarios have various abnormal behavior 
as seen in the deviation plot. Also, because they use the network to achieve their goal, the attacks 
have behavior that can be seen on the network. 
Simulation 30: DoS Flooding Attack: The DoS flooding attack (Figure 4.20) is 
practically the same as the actuator becoming stuck in the way that it manifests itself in the 
physical system. When the DoS attack occurs, no new information is sent to the actuator. This 
means that the actuator remains in the same position according to the last command it receives 
from the controller. Also, no new information is sent to the controller, which is different than the 
actuator becoming unresponsive. 
 As far as the network behavior is concerned, the controller is not updated during the time 
of the DoS attack, which is similar to the previous set. Therefore because the controller is not 
updated it will use the last known sensor value [1]. The network utilization goes to 0%. 
  
Simulation 45: Injection Attack on the Controller: The scenario (Figure 4.21) shows 
the effects of an injection attack on the controller that involves sending deceptive data that 
indicates to the controller that there is no pressure in tank 2. As the attack occurs, the controller 
responds to the false data by opening the valves. Once the attack occurs, the sensor values of the 
datagrams sent by the malicious entity to the controller are at 0. 
As for the network behavior, it should be noted that the controller is also updated and the 
network utilization is at a higher level during the period of the attack (network utilization = 
59%). The physical system behavior is similar the previous set.  
 
Simulation 60: Injection Attack on the Plant: The injection attack on the plant causes 
the valves to be open (Figure 4.22). Therefore, the pressures in the tanks will continue to 
increase. The controller will still receive datagrams from the plant. Therefore, the perceived 
behavior will essentially be the same as the actual behavior. 
Similar to the attack on the controller, the attack on the plant has certain network 
behavior such as the following: (1) updated datagrams throughout the simulation. (2) Increased 
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network utilization during the time of the attack. The network utilization becomes 24% during 
the attack. 
 
Discussion of the Abnormal Sets 
After observing these plots, the similarities and differences of these scenarios should be 
noted. For the abnormal cases, there are similarities in the physical system for many of these 
cases. For instance, these scenarios do have deviations associated with them. It is true that the 
way these deviations may appear are different as functions of time, but it may also be possible 
that these abnormal scenarios can be constructed so that they are closer in appearance. For some 
abnormal scenarios, it is more difficult to distinguish the different abnormal situations from one 
another only using the information gained from the physical system. These abnormal situations 
include attacks and faults. For such cases more information must be included. The best example 
of this is seen in the DoS attacks (figures 4.10 and 4.20) and the unresponsive actuator (figures 
4.4 and 4.14), which are essentially identical if information from the physical system is all that is 
observed. It should be noted that these plots have deviations that are similar in shape, although 
one is larger than the other. There are some differences between these two scenarios as well. One 
difference is that the sensor value that the controller uses from the onset of the abnormality to the 
end of the simulation remains constant. Using information from the network, the controller sees 
that it is not updated because of the lack of legitimate packets that it receives. On the other hand, 
for the unresponsive actuator, it is the state of the valve that remains constant, and the network 
behavior will appear to be normal to the controller. Therefore, the different scenarios do not have 
behavior that is totally unique from the information of the physical system alone. However, they 
have different behavior of the network that causes them to be unique. Uniqueness is required in 
order to make a distinction.  It should be understood that in fault diagnosis, there is a concept 
known as insolubility. This refers to the ability to distinguish one fault from another. This is 
useful in order to be able to locate the fault in the system [20]. This work does not focus on 
distinguishing one fault from another. Instead, it focuses on distinguishing faults from attacks, 
based on certain characteristics that they have. The main characteristic that an attack has which 
differentiates it from a fault is that the network behavior is correlated with the physical behavior 
that the attack causes. When the plots are compared, it can be seen that there are similarities in 
the plots for the physical system, but there are some differences in the network behavior. This 
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network behavior that is observed by the controller includes whether it is updated, the amount of 
network activity, and the inter-arrival time between packets that are received by the controller. 
 
Part II: Experiments with Diagnosis 
For this work, a set of 66 unique simulations were performed in Omnet++ through the 
use of a batch script in the command line interface of Omnet++. The script allowed for the 
automation of multiple simulations. The break-down of these simulations according to the mid-
level categories (normal, fault, and attacks) were as follows: Simulation 1 was a simulation with 
normal operation. Simulations 2-21 were simulations with faults. Simulations 22-66 were 
simulations with attacks. Features were extracted from the simulations according to what was 
discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, there were 66 sets of features. There are a certain 
number of features per “window”. Basically, in this work, a “window is defined as an equal 
section of the simulation time. In the case of this project there are 10 windows per simulation. 
Ten features are extracted from each window. Therefore, 100 features are used per simulation. 
The following is a table of the features of a window extracted for each simulation followed by a 
description of each (Table 4.1). 
 
Feature # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Abbreviated 
name 
T1PMax T2PMax T1DevM T1DevM Dev1Ch Dev2Ch ErrorMax InterTime Update NetTraff 
Table 4.1: Table of the Features for a Given Window 
 
The descriptions of each of these features are as follows according their feature number: 
1. T1PMax: This is the maximum pressure in tank 1 according to the packets received by 
the controller. Specifically, it is the maximum of a set of values for pressure that the 
controller receives for a given window. 
2. T2PMax: This is the same as above except it is for tank 2 instead 
3. T1DevM: This is the deviation of tank 1. 
4. T2DevM: This is the deviation of tank 2. 
5. Dev1Ch: This feature is used to indicate whether there is a change in the deviation for a 
window compared with the previous window in tank 1. The possible values for this 
feature are -1, 0, 1. The value of -1 indicates that there is a significant decrease. The 
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value 0 indicates that there is no change or hardly any change. Basically there is a certain 
tolerance or range of values. Within this range, the deviation is considered to have no 
significant change. The value 1 indicates that there is a significant increase. 
6. Dev2Ch: This is the same as the one above except it is for tank 2. 
7. ErrorMax. This is the maximum error for a given window that is associated with the 
control system. The error is defined as the difference between the set-point and the 
measured value. This variable is useful because DoS attacks are particularly destructive 
when there is a significant error as opposed to when the system is in steady state. 
8. InterTime: This is the inter-arrival time between packets. It is specifically defined as the 
time between two consecutive incoming packets. This time is determined according to 
the clock of the controller. 
9. Update: This is a Boolean variable that indicates that the controller is updated by a 
legitimate packet from the sensor via the network. It is also possible that the controller is 
updated by a packet that appears legitimate but is really from a malicious entity. This is a 
useful feature because it allows for a way to detect whether a DoS attack is occurring. If 
this Boolean variable has a value of 0, then based on intuition it can be hypothesized that 
a DoS attack is occurring. Also, although this is not included in this work, if it is a 0, then 
it may be that there is a network failure. For this case, there would not be network 
activity in the NCS. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that a distinction can be made 
between a DoS attack and a network failure. 
10. NetTraff: This is a measure of the Network Traffic Activity that the Controller receives 
from the channel of the network that it is directly connected to. It indicates the amount of 
traffic on the network from the perspective of the controller. This is measured in bps (Bits 
per Second). 
 
 
The 66 scenarios were expanded to 125, by making copies of some of the features with noise 
added (Faults and Attacks) for several scenarios or using noise variation within experiments 
(Normal). This was done so that there was a roughly equal number of normal cases, cases with 
faults, and cases with attacks. This could be done in this work because it was not known exactly 
how often one type of situation occurs as compared to others since there is no known statistical 
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data that can be used to make this determination. The focus of this work is to instead determine 
how well different abnormal scenarios can be distinguished and classified based on a unique 
signature. The table below shows how these simulations were expanded (Table 4.2): 
 
Classification Scheme   
 High 
Level 
Mid 
Level Low Level 
Scenario 
Numbers 
Number of Scenarios  per low-
level category with noise 
Normal Normal Normal 1 40 
Abnormal         
  Faults       
    Damaged Plant sims 2-6 15 
    Small Sensor Bias sims 7-11 15 
    Large Sensor Bias sims 12-16 15 
    Actuator Stuck sims 17-21 15 
  Attacks       
    DoS Flooding sims 22-36 15 
    Injection to Plant sims 37-51 15 
    Injection to Controller sims 52-66 15 
    Total Unique Scenarios: 66 145 (125 used) 
Table 4.2: Scenarios by Classification Scheme 
 
One hundred sets of features were given as input for the classifier in order to train it. Each set of 
features consisted of 100 features.  The remaining 25 sets were used for the testing phase.  
It is important to note that the labeling of scenarios for the naïve Bayes classifier was done 
according to all of the three classification schemes, which are basically the three levels of 
categories described in the previous chapter. MATLAB provides this Naïve Bayes classifier, 
which can be used by means of MATLAB scripts. The following tables show how the categories 
for all three levels are labeled for the classifier: 
 
Label 1 2 
Class Name Normal Abnormal 
Table 4.3: Labels Used for the First Scheme (High Level) 
 
Label 1 2 3 
Class Name Normal Fault Attack 
Table 4.4: Labels used for the Second Scheme (Mid Level): 
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Label 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Class 
Name 
Normal Actuator 
Stuck 
Sensor 
Bias(small) 
Sensor 
Bias(large) 
Damaged 
Plant 
DoS 
Attack 
Injection  
Con. 
Injection  
Plant 
Table 4.5: Labels Used for the Third Scheme (Low Level): 
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Results from using the naïve Bayes classifier: 
 
After all the necessary CSV files were generated with the data that the features are based 
on, the machine learning algorithm was executed using a MATLAB script, which generated the 
results according to the three main schemes of classifying the scenarios. For this set of 
experiments with the classifier, all 10 features were used to train the classifier: 
 
The following are sets of confusion matrices. Confusion matrices are used to display the 
data and to summarize the results in concise format. Confusion matrices are useful for 
representing results from the machine learning algorithm for cases of classifying. The rows are 
actual classes for the data. The columns indicated what is predicted as a result of the 
classification of the machine learning algorithm. The numbers in the diagonal indicate correctly 
classified experiments. Off of the diagonal are the incorrectly classified experiments [22]. The 
accuracy can be calculated by dividing the correctly classified scenarios by the total numbers of 
scenarios that are used in the testing phase. It can be defined as the result of dividing the trace of 
the matrix or the sum of the diagonal elements by the total number of test cases. The result of 
this is expressed as a percentage.  These matrices show the results of using the machine 
algorithm to classify 25 sets of test data. Each of these sets has 100 features as described 
previously.  The results are according to the three classifications schemes, which are based on 
the levels in figure 3.6 found in Chapter 3.  
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Confusion Matrices for the Results where the Features from Both Physical System 
and Network are used to train the Classifier 
 
  
Predicted 
  
Normal Abnormal 
Actual 
Normal 5 0 
Abnormal 0 20 
Table 4.6: Confusion Matrix for the First Scheme of Classifying (Accuracy: 100%) 
 
  
Predicted 
  
Normal Faults Attacks 
Actual 
Normal 5 0 0 
Faults 0 9 0 
Attacks 0 1 10 
Table 4.7: Second Scheme of classifying 
(Accuracy: 96%; Accuracy for distinguishing faults and attacks (As seen from grayed area in the above 
table): 95%) 
 
  
Normal Faults Attacks 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Normal 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Faults 
2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
  5 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Attacks 
6 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Table 4.8: Third Scheme of classifying  
(Overall Accuracy: 100%, Accuracy between faults and attacks: 100%) 
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In order to calculate the accuracy for the mid-level categories when using the Third 
Classification scheme, the sub-matrices in the grey area that are separated from each other by the 
dotted lines are used. All the entries of a given sub-matrix were added together. This was done 
for each sub-matrix so that the following table could be produced. 
 
 Faults Attacks 
Faults 9 0 
Attacks 1 10 
 Table 4.9:  Submatrix-Attacks/Faults (Total abnormal scenarios: 19; Total correctly classified abnormal 
scenarios: 17; Accuracy indistinguishing faults and attacks: 95%) 
 
The accuracy for each of these matrices was fairly high. Of course, it is useful to have 
some sort of a comparison. Since there is no other work to compare with for this particular data, 
it is useful to instead compare these results with the case where the network data that is sent to 
the controller is excluded from the features fed into the machine learning algorithm. The results 
for doing this are expressed in the next set of tables. The following three confusion matrices 
show the results for the Naïve Bayes Classifier when only the first seven features are used: 
 
  
72 
 
Confusion Matrices for the Results where the Features from Both Physical System 
and Network are used to train the Classifier 
 
  
Predicted 
  
Normal Abnormal 
Actual 
Normal 5 0 
Abnnormal 0 20 
Table 4.10: First Scheme (Accuracy:  100%) 
 
  
Predicted 
  
Normal Faults Attacks 
Actual 
Normal 5 0 0 
Faults 0 9 0 
Attacks 0 3 8 
Table 4.11: Second Scheme (Overall accuracy: 88% Accuracy in distinguishing attacks from faults: 85%) 
 
  
Normal Faults Attacks 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Normal 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Faults 
2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
  5 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Attacks 
6 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Table 4.12: Third Scheme (Overall accuracy: 88% Accuracy for classifying the mid-level categories - attacks 
and faults: 95%) 
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 In order to calculate the accuracy for the mid-level categories when using the Third 
Classification scheme, the sub-matrices in the grey area that are separated from each other by the 
dotted lines are used. All the entries of a given sub-matrix were added together. This was done 
for each sub-matrix so that the following table could be produced. 
 
 Faults Attacks 
Faults 9 0 
Attacks 1 10 
 Table 4.13: Submatrix-attacks/faults (Total abnormal scenarios: 19; Total correctly classified abnormal 
scenarios: 17; Accuracy indistinguishing faults and attacks: 95%) 
 
There appears to be increased accuracy when the faults are broken down into their many 
types. The reason that there is increased accuracy is that each of the attacks and faults that were 
simulated had signatures that were somewhat distinct from the others. But when all the attacks 
were put together as one class, these signatures were obscured to the point that faults and attacks 
were not as distinguishable.  
 
Discussion 
 
From the results, certain experiments were done to calculate the accuracy for 
distinguishing faults from attacks using the Naïve Bayes Classifier. The results of using all of the 
features for this classifier are compared with the results of using the features restricted only to 
the physical system. The accuracy improved when features from the network were included. 
These results are useful for showing accuracy, but there needs to be a more practical use for this 
diagnosis. It must be understood that a plant operator or the SCADA system itself would be 
alerted of an attack or fault. Periodically, there will be a status message of the system sent to the 
plant operator that would use a machine learning algorithm to classify the behavior of the 
system. This status message may tell the user whether the system is experiencing normal 
conditions or abnormal conditions. If the user is told that abnormal conditions are occurring, the 
problem must be addressed. But it must be addressed appropriately, which means that once the 
nature of the problem (i.e. whether it is a fault, attack, etc.) is diagnosed; the problem can be 
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dealt with. For instance, if it is discovered that the problem is an attack, the situation may be 
dealt with by increasing the security of the facility and use whatever means necessary to 
eliminate the threat. On the other hand if the problem is a fault, it is important to investigate the 
plant to determine if must be shutdown. It is also necessary to identify the problem and repair it.  
Therefore, because these two types of situations are dealt with differently, it is important to be 
able to distinguish between faults and attacks. In the example of Stuxnet, it would have been 
helpful for the plant operators to know not only that an abnormal situation is occurring but that a 
cyber-attack is occurring as opposed to faults or degradations of equipment. In the case of 
Stuxnet, plant operators kept replacing the centrifuges, but this did not address the true problem. 
If it can be determined that a cyber-attack is occurring, then it may be more properly addressed. 
In general, the process of dealing with the various situations based on the information given is 
illustrated in Figure 4.23. In the figure, a supervisory system periodically analyzes data received 
from the networked control system. It then diagnoses the situation experienced by the NCS. The 
box labeled “update” in the figure is the updated diagnosis, which is done at certain intervals that 
are set according to design specifications. 
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Figure 4.23: Flow Chart showing responses to be taken based on the updated status of the NCS 
 
As far as generalizing the problem is considered, it may be useful to understand the 
systems from a qualitative sense. For instance, a DoS attack may cause a change in the behavior 
that is different from the nominal behavior, where this change can be detected. Also, the 
controller detects that it is not updated with new packets. This description for these symptoms 
may be applicable to other NCS. In addition, the actuator becoming stuck may be detected based 
on the fact that there is a change in behavior that deviates from the nominal, yet the controller 
continues to be updated. This qualitative description may be true for other NCS’s as well. 
Normal?
Normal
Response:
Wait till next update
Yes
Fault
Response:
(1)Investigate the Plant.
(2) In most cases,  shut 
down the system.
(3) Identify the problem.
(4) Repair it.
No
Fault?
Attack!
Response:
(1) determine  the best 
course of action to 
eliminate the threat.
(2) Increase the security.
Yes No
New Update
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Detection and response are two important aspects of ensuring security for SCADA 
systems. One of the aspects of this work that distinguishes this work from others is the fact that it 
takes into account the possibility of faults in more depth than other work in addition to cyber-
attacks. It also explores different scenarios with the major types of abnormal circumstances that a 
cyber-physical system may experience. It should be noted that there is some work that addressed 
the issue of faults along with cyber-attacks. This has been done to a limited degree, but in other 
cases it is done to a greater degree. For instance, the work by Litrico et al. discusses faults 
[3],[4], but it is not concerned with isolating them from attacks but instead is mainly concerned 
with finding an anomaly in the system if such an anomaly occurs. The work by Bruno Sinopoli 
[25], which is focused on integrity attacks also addresses faults and does look at faults and 
attacks based on their signature at least in the discussion of the simulation results. 
For this work, a supervisory system can analyze the data it received from the system. 
This is done to determine the most likely scenario that the system is experiencing so that the 
system or the plant operator can make a good decision on what to do with the SCADA system. 
Being able to respond appropriately to the system would ensure that safety and efficiency can be 
achieved, or to at least ensure that safety and efficiency can be achieved to some reasonable level 
with safety being the priority. It is important to note that the different plants for SCADA systems 
may be quite different in their behavior. Therefore, for every unique model, it may be necessary 
to simulate that unique model to observe the effects of certain attacks and other types of 
abnormal circumstances. However, it is possible that the problem can be generalized. In order for 
this to be done, the symptoms associated with the various anomalies can be understood in a 
qualitative sense. For instance, it may be possible that other networked control systems will have 
a similar set of symptoms present for specific types of faults or attacks.   
This work explores the basic notion that, given information from the network in addition 
to information from the plant, which can be seen through the sensor data, it may be possible to 
better understand the situation that the networked control system is experiencing. With this 
additional information, it is possible that a better distinction between faults and attacks can be 
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made. The reason that the information from the network is important is that it is possible that 
with certain common attacks, the network behavior is somehow correlated with the behavior as 
seen from the physical system. 
The results of the experiments show that the accuracy of the diagnosis can be improved if 
information can be included from the network in addition to information in the physical system 
to allow for distinguishing between faults and attacks. Previous work dealing with the security in 
SCADA systems focused on computer systems and networks alone, or it focusing on the sensor 
readings from the physical system to detect for an anomaly. One of the goals of this work was to 
collect information from both the network and the physical system in a NCS. Another goal was 
to understand symptoms in the NCS due to various circumstances that the NCS has a possibility 
of experiencing, i.e faults and attacks. It was also the goal of this work to be able to diagnose the 
given situation of the NCS based on the symptoms as detected by the supervisory system also to 
know how well various scenarios can be distinguished from the each other. 
 Future work that could be done would be to investigate other types of attacks that the 
networked control system can experience.  Simulations of these other attacks on the networked 
control system can be performed to observe their behavior and better understand various 
symptoms. Therefore, it should be noted that the scenarios used in this work may not have been 
exhaustive, meaning that all the possible attacks that the system could experience were not 
included. The scenarios only included attacks where the nodes of the control network were not 
compromised or reprogrammed. Future work could address the types of attacks where these 
nodes are compromised to understand their behavior. The focus was on attacks that send packets 
that influence the network maliciously. These attacks include injection attacks and DoS attacks. 
It may also be necessary to investigate other pattern recognition and machine learning techniques 
to experiment with other methods of diagnosis or classification. The main goal of this work was 
to investigate some of the well-known attacks, and assess how well they can be distinguished 
from common faults that could occur. One goal for future work could be to devise a new type of 
intrusion detection system that is more specific to SCADA systems. It was of the aims of this 
work to move in the direction of doing so by understanding the symptoms of various 
circumstances and determining how well they can be distinguished with the goal of being able to 
diagnose the system to some reasonable degree. 
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